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INTERNATIONAL LAW- CRIMINAL LAW- JURISDICTION OVER ALIENS 
FOR CRIMES COMMITTED ABROAD - Six alien defendants were convicted 
under a federal statute1 for knowingly making false statements before 
United States consular officials abroad in order to procure nonquota immi-
grant visas. Their motion to dismiss this count on the ground that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to indict and try aliens for crimes commit-
ted outside the territorial limits of the United States was denied.2 On 
appeal, held, affirmed. As a necessary incident to its sovereignty, the United 
States is competent to punish aliens apprehended within the United 
States for acts against its sovereignty committed outside the country. 
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 
(1961). 
Of the five general principles of international law used by nations as 
the basis of asserting penal jurisdiction,3 the territorial principle, under 
which only acts committed within a country's borders are punishable, has 
often been expressed as the limit of the competence of the United States 
in exercising criminal jurisdiction.4 Traditionally, however, the United 
States has also asserted the authority, based on the nationality principle, 
to punish its nationals for acts committed abroad in violation of laws of 
the United States made applicable to them.5 This principle recognizes the 
almost unlimited legal control a state has over persons owing it allegiance.6 
In addition, the United States has expanded its basic territorial principle 
1 The statute provides a fine or imprisonment for "whoever knowingly makes under 
oath any false statement .•• in any application, affidavit, or other document required 
by the immigration laws or regulations ...• " 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1958). 
2 United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960) . 
3 These five principles are the territorial principle; the nationality principle; the 
protective principle; the universality principle, under which jurisdiction is based solely 
upon custody of the accused; and the passive personality principle, under which juris· 
diction is determined by reference to the nationality or national character of the person 
injured. Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Harvard Law 
School, Part II, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 .ru.r. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 435, 445 
(1935) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD RE.sEARcHJ. The first three principles are discussed 
in the text; the last two are less widely accepted among nations and are not germane 
to this discussion. 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1922); American Banana Co. 
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
362, 370 (1824); Yenkichi Ito v. United States, 64 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
289 U.S. 762 (1933); United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); 
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 232 (5th ed. 1955); 2 HACKWORTH, A DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW § 136 (1941); HARVARD REsEARCH 435, 544, 556; JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 39-40, 43 (1956) ; 2 l\IOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 255, 263 (1906). 
Ii See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) ; Blackmer v. United States, 
284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Bowman, supra note 4; Gillars v. United States, 
182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948). 
The United States has also exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed 
by persons aboard ships flying its flag and acts of piracy. See United States v. Furlong, 
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820) ; United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820). 
6 HARVARD RESEARCH 519. 
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to embrace the so-called "objective" territorial principle under which 
jurisdiction is asserted over crimes commenced extraterritorially which are 
consummated within the country, or over crimes committed entirely out-
side the country which produce detrimental effects intemally.7 
The principal case is the first instance in which a United States court 
has expressly asserted the protective principle as the basis for jurisdiction 
over the acts of an alien committed abroad. 8 This principle has been 
recognized, however, by most other nations9 when the acts committed 
abroad were directed at their credit, security, political independence or 
territorial integrity. Jurisdiction under the protective principle is not 
based on the locus of the crime or the nationality of the offender but on 
the nature of the interest injured.10 Its proponents justify such jurisdic-
tion on a theory of sel£-defense11-the necessity of punishing those who 
would otherwise threaten a country's social, political and economic interests 
from abroad with impunity because of the lack of effective legislation by 
7 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619-21 (1927) ; Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 
280, 284-85 (191I); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (1945). 
See HARVARD R.EsEARCH 487-94; Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 
30 MrcH. L. REv. 238, 253-54 (1931). 
8 However, similar results have been reached in a few cases without the protective 
principle being expressly adopted. See United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 
1943) where an alien was convicted of falsely swearing under oath before a United 
States consular official in Mexico. The court based its jurisdiction on alternative grounds, 
the one pertinent to this discussion being that the offense had not been committed on 
foreign territory since the fraud was not in the act but in the result attained, that is, 
" •.• the attempt, through a false oath, to secure an advantage in the United States, by 
obtaining an affidavit which would have no validity except for the .•. [immigration 
laws]." Id. at 711. In other similar fact situations convictions have been affirmed without 
comment on the jurisdictional question. Chin Bick Wah v. United States, 245 F.2d 274 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957) ; United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 
405 (2d Cir. 1956) . And the protective principle would seem to be the only basis for 
the Court in United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1922) commenting on the 
possibility of punishing a British subject, when apprehended, for acts committed abroad 
to defraud the United States Government. But see United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 
546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) where the court held it was without jurisdiction to try an alien 
who, while in Canada, falsified and concealed a material fact in a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the immigration authorities. Neither Archer nor the protective principle 
were discussed. The court concluded that Strassheim v. Daily, supra note 7, required a 
further act by the alien within the United States since jurisdiction over aliens can only 
be based on the territorial principle. 
For apparent interstate applications of the protective principle, see Hanks v. State, 
13 Tex. Ct. App. R. 289 (1882) (affirming conviction for forging Texas land titles in 
Louisiana); and N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1933, which represents an odd intermixture of the 
"objective" territorial principle and the protective principle. 
9 HARVARD R.EsEARcH 543, 546; JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 4, at 50. But see Garcia• 
Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners for Treason and Offenses Against the 
Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. Prrr. L R.Ev. 567, 584 
(1958), where the author cautions against ". . . inferring from the practice of the 
States any general rule of international law sanctioning the assumption of jurisdiction 
over foreigners for acts committed in foreign territory." 
10 HARVARD REsEARCH 445, 543. 
11 Garcia-Mora, supra note 9, at 579, 584. 
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the foreign country to punish such acts, and the absence of any effective 
international authority.12 The previous opposition of the United States 
to the extraterritorial exercise of a country's penal jurisdiction is evidenced 
by the vigorous objections raised by our government when another country 
has presumed to exercise such jurisdiction over an American citizen.13 
This critical attitude stems from the knowledge that the comprehensive 
"protective" statutes of many foreign countries have often been used as 
a means of punishing crimes of a political nature,14 and from an apprehen-
sion that express recognition of the principle by this country could lead 
to such unacceptable extensions of national power.15 Although the statute 
involved in the principal case deals only with specific non-political acts, 
this formal cognizance of the protective principle runs counter to these 
long-held objections. But whatever may be the ultimate wisdom in now 
adopting this principle, the United States as a sovereign nation is clearly 
competent under the tenets of international law to do so.16 
In considering the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
protective principle, the court was reluctant to recognize it as a clear 
departure from the territorial and nationality principles. On the one 
hand, the court held that the counts under which the defendants were 
convicted alleged only acts committed outside the United States17 and did 
not rest upon defendants' subsequent entries into this country.18 And in 
view of its determination that Congress intended the statute to reach 
such extraterritorial offenses,19 the court flatly stated that " ... under 'the 
protective principle' . . • there is, and should be, jurisdiction."20 In 
addition, the court posed the hypothetical case of an alien who falsely 
swears an affidavit abroad on behalf of another alien who makes no use 
of the fraudulently-procured document. The court reasoned that the 
first alien should be subject to prosecution in the United States in the same 
manner as a citizen of the United States would be for such acts committed 
against the sovereignty of the United States.21 This analogy is unfortu-
nate since it overlooks the vital distinction that jurisdiction over acts of a 
citizen in such a case is based on his nationality and that no similar bond 
of allegiance exists in the case of an alien. But, importantly, the court's 
12 HARVARD REsEAR.CH 552-53. But see Garcia-Mora, supra note 9, at 584-89 for a 
critical analysis of the arguments put forth in support of the protective principle. 
13 See 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 228 for a discussion of "Cutting's Case," an 
attempt by Mexico to prosecute a United States citizen for libelous statements concerning 
a Mexican citizen published only in the United States. 
14 Garcia-Mora, supra note 9, at 578-83. 
1li JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 4, at 50. 
16 HARVARD REsEARCH 546. 
17 Principal case at 547-48. 
18 Id. at 547. 
10 Ibid. 
20 Id. at 549. 
!ll Id. at 548. 
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use of this hypothetical situation indicates that the court accepted the 
protective principle as embracing acts committed wholly outside a coun-
try which produce no tangible effects within that country.22 On the other 
hand, the court seemed unwilling to adopt this conclusion as its holding 
since it proceeded to analogize jurisdiction asserted under the protective 
principle to jurisdiction under the "objective" territorial principle. The 
court accurately reasoned that since the United States has always claimed 
the power under the "objective" territorial principle to punish aliens 
within the United States for acts committed abroad intended to produce, 
and producing, effects detrimental to persons and property within the 
United States, it logically can punish extraterritorial acts which have a 
detrimental effect on this country's sovereignty.23 But by seemingly equat-
ing the country's sovereignty with its territorial limits, and when finding 
the requisite injurious effect on sovereignty in the aliens' subsequent 
entries into the country,24 the court carried the analogy too far. The 
"objective" territorial principle requires that the act produce a tangible 
effect within the country in order to support the fiction that the actor is 
constructively "present" where the effect is felt, thus providing the basis 
for asserting jurisdiction in the name of the territorial principle. How-
ever, no such fictional "presence" is necessary under the protective prin-
ciple which looks only to the nature of the interest affected, not to the 
locus of the act. Admittedly a nation's sovereign power (and thus 
its sovereignty) can extend beyond its territorial borders; logically, then, 
its sovereignty is subject to attack outside the country's borders without 
tangible effects necessarily resulting within the country's territorial limits. 
This distinction between the two principles is basic. Yet the language and 
reasoning of the court leave some doubt whether it viewed the protective 
principle as merely a facet of our basic territorial principle or as a separate 
basis of jurisdiction resting upon different considerations. 
Frank G. Reeder, S.Ed. 
22 The lower court disagreed: "Any act which would offend the sovereignty of a 
nation must, of necessity, have some effect within the territorial limits of that state or 
there would be no adverse effect upon the government justifying a penal sanction," 
United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489 (S.D. Cal. 1960) . 
23 Principal case at 548-49. 
24 Ibid. 
